

Message Text

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41

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

----- 043035

R 120230Z DEC 74

FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5628

INFO USMISSION NEW YORK

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY NASSAU

AMEMBASPL MANILA

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 JAKARTA 14919

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

EXDIS

USUN PLEASE PASS STEVENSON

NEW DELHI HOLD FOR MOORE

CANBERRA HOLD FOR OXMAN

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

POLAD PASS AMBASSADORS NEWSOM AND SULLIVAN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PLOS ID

SUBJ: LOS: FULL DELEGATION CONSULTATIONS WITH INDONESIA
ON ARCHIPELAGOS AND STRAITS, DECEMBER 9-10, 1974

REF: JAKARTA 14833

1. SUMMARY AND EVALUATION: WHILE AGREEMENT NOT
REACHED, MAJOR ADVANCES BETWEEN USG AND GOI ACHIEVED
ARE AS FOLLOWS IN FULL DELEGATION SESSIONS.

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(A) GOI DID NOT CONTEST INCLUSION OF RIGHT OF OVER-

FLIGHT OVER ARCHIPELAGO OR STRAITS, AND CONCENTRATED ONLY ON PROBLEMS OF AIR TRAFFIC SAFETY OF ARCHIPELAGO; (B) RESPECTIVE POSITIONS ON BREADTH OF ARCHIPELAGIC LANES SOMEWHAT NARROWED TO ESSENTIALLY 20 MILES AND 80 MILES, WITH RECOGNITION THAT POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION ON ISSUE WOULD BE NECESSARY; (C) FOR THE FIRST TIME THERE WAS A MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION OF STRAITS REGIME WITH GOI CONCENTRATING ON PARTICULAR PROBLEMS IN MALACCA RATHER THAN CONCEPTUAL ISSUES, AND EXPLICITLY NOTING THAT SUBMERGED TRANSIT WAS NOT PROBLEM BECAUSE THERE COULD BE NO SUBMERGED NAVIGATION IN MALACCA ANYWAY AS A PRACTICAL MATTER. IN PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH SOEDARMONO, PERSONAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REVIEW OF THE GOVERNMENTS FURTHER NARROWED THE GAPS (SEPTIL) WHICH CONSTITUTES MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF VISIT. WHILE WE WOULD NOT MINIMIZE THE IMPORTANCE TO GOI OF OUR DIFFERENCES ON PRECISE QUESTIONS SUCH AS BREADTH OF LANES OR AIR TRAFFIC SAFETY, OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT FAILURE TO FINALIZE AGREEMENT IS NOT DUE TO THESE PRECISE ISSUES BUT TO LIKELIHOOD THAT GOI HAS NOT MADE BASIC POLITICAL DECISION THAT IT WISHED TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH USG AT THIS MEETING BUT RATHER PREFERRED TO REACH FINAL AGREEMENT AFTER OPPORTUNITY FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH NEIGHBORING STATES. A CONSISTENT OVERTONE OF COMMENTS FROM FOREIGN OFFICE PERSONNEL, AS WELL AS JUSTICE MINISTER MOCHTAR, WAS FEAR OF ADVERSE REACTION FROM OTHER STRAITS STATES, NON-ALIGNED, AND GROUP OF 77 OF HAVING "SOLD OUT" TO THE MARITIME POWERS. FOREIGN OFFICE MAY STILL FEEL THAT BEST APPROACH IS GROUP OF 77 BLOC STRATEGY, INCLUDING SUPPORT FROM SOME DEVELOPED STATES. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT APPEARS THAT THE DEFENSE MINISTRY IS INTERESTED IN ASSURING UNIVERSAL, PARTICULARLY MAJOR POWER, RECOGNITION OF THE ARCHIPELAGO. ONE POSSIBLE POINT OF CONFLUENCE BETWEEN FOREIGN OFFICE AND DEFENSE MINISTRY APPROACHES MAY BE FEAR OF CHINESE REACTION TO AN ARCHIPELAGO SETTLEMENT THAT SATISFIES US AND SOVIET TRANSIT CONCERNS. HOWEVER, THERE ARE SOME SIGNS THAT NEW FOREIGN OFFICE LEGAL ADVISOR JUSUF IS NOT ENTIRELY PERSUADED BY GROUP OF 77 STRATEGY, CONFIDENTIAL

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AND THAT DJALAL HIMSELF RECOGNIZES THAT LDC'S MIGHT NOT IN THE LAST ANALYSIS ABANDON CHANCES FOR UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT ON ECONOMIC ZONE BECAUSE OF NAVIGATION ISSUES. OUR CHANCES FOR AGREEMENT WITH GOI BEFORE GENEVA ARE THEREFORE DEPENDENT LARGELY ON DEFENSE MINISTRY PREVAILING WITH PRESIDENT SUHARTO, AND, IN THIS CONNECTION, PERSUADING GOI THAT AGREEMENT WITH US IS SAFER ROUTE TO EFFECTIVE RECOGNITION OF ARCHIPELAGO

THAN GROUP OF 77 STRATEGY. END SUMMARY AND EVALUATION.

2. US PARTICIPANTS: PROF JOHN NORTON MOORE, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA AND DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF RHT LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE; MR. BERNARD H. OXMAN, VICE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT FOR LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE AND ASSISTANT LEGAL ADVISOR FOR OCEANS, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; MR. TERRY MCINTYRE, OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; REAR ADMIRAL MAX MORRIS, REPRESENTATIVE FOR LAW OF THE SEA MATTERS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; CAPTAIN GLENN YOUNG, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION FOR LAW OF THE SEA.

3. INDONESIAN PARTICIPANTS: AIR MARSHAL SOEDARMONO, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY IN THE CAPACITY OF HEAD OF COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF MATTERS PERTAINING TO NATIONAL TERRITORY AND TO SEABED (PANKORWILNAS); MRS. E.H. WIRJOSAPOTRO-LAURENS, ACTING DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; DR. HASJIM DJALAL, MINISTER COUNSELOR/INDONESIAN EMBASSY IN SINGAPORE; BRIGADIER GENERAL PRANOTO ASMORO, HEAD OF NATIONAL COORDINATING AGENCY FOR SURVEY AND MAPPING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY; MR. SUFFRI JUSUF, HEAD OF THE DIRECTORATE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS; MR. SANITIOSO, OFFICIAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION; MR. SUMBARJONO, OFFICIAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MINING; CONFIDENTIAL

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MR. HASANUDDIN SAANIN, OFFICIAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; REAR ADMIRAL PRASODJO MAHDI, OFFICIAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY; FIRST MARSHAL SOEDARMAN, OFFICIAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY; FIRST ADMIRAL D. PARDJAMAN, OFFICIAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY, CHIEF OF THE NAVAL HYDROGRAPHY; COLONEL TRIHARDJO, OFFICIAL OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY; MR. IMRAD IDRIS, HEAD OF THE DIRECTORATE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

NOTE BY OC/T: 3 SECTION MESSAGE. NOT PASSED CINCPAC.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

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R 120230Z DEC 74

FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5629

INFO USMISSION NEW YORK

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY NASSAU

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 JAKARTA 14919

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

EXDIS

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NEW DELHI HODL FOR MOORE

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POLAD PLEASE PASS AMBASSADORS NEWSOM AND SULLIVAN

4. OPENING REMARKS. IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, MARSHAL SOEDARMONO SAID THAT THE CARACAS SESSION WAS A LANDMARK AND THAT THERE WERE MANY THINGS TO DO BEFORE GENEVA WITH INDONESIA'S NEIGHBORS AND OTHERS. HE WAS NOT VERY SATISFIED WITH PROGRESS THUS FAR AS A NUMBER OF THE COUNTRIES INDONESIA WAS CONSULTING WITH WERE TRYING TOO PLAY THEIR CARDS AT THE LATEST POSSIBLE TIME. IT IS IMPORTANT TO ACHIEVE BILATERAL UNDERSTANDINGS BEFORE GENEVA. HE HOPES THAT IN THESE TALKS WE COULD ACHIEVE WHAT WE WANT. HE LATER NOTED THAT INDONESIA WOULD CONSULT WITH THE PHILIPPINES AND WITH ASEAN NEIGHBORS. GOI HAD NO CONSULTATIONS SINCE CARACAS WITH MARITIME POWERS AND BASICALLY WAS RELYING ON USG TO DO THIS, ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT CONSULT WITH SOME MARITIME
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NATIONS. MOORE EMPHASIZED THREE BASIC POINTS:
DEFINITION OF ARCHIPELAGO, UNIMPEDED ARCHIPELAGIC
TRANSIT THROUGH, OVER AND UNDER THE ARCHIPELAGO, AND
SUPPORT FOR UNIMPEDED PASSAGE OF STRAITS. IT WAS
AGREED THAT TALKS WOULD CONCENTRATE ON THREE MAIN
UNRESOLVED ISSUES: BREADTH OF ARCHIPELAGIC LANES,
OVERFLIGHT RIGHT, AND SUPPORT FOR UNIMPEDED PASSAGE OF STRAITS.

5. DEFINITION OF ARCHIPELAGO. BASIC CONCERN OF BOTH
SIDES WAS DEFINITION THAT WOULD ALSO SATISFY OTHER
ARCHIPELAGO NATIONS. DJALAL SAID CONSULTATIONS AMONG
ARCHIPELAGO NATIONS REVEALED DESIRE FOR MAXIMUM LINE
OF 100 MILES, WITH EXCEPTION THAT 5 PERCENT OF LINES
COULD BE UP TO 125 MILES. MOORE INDICATED THAT IN
CONSULTATIONS WITH BAHAMAS IN JANUARY, IF SATISFACTORY
AGREEMENT ON OTHER POINTS CAN BE REACHED, WE
MIGHT USE A SOMEWHAT LARGER LAND-TO-WATER RATION
THAN 1:5, AND THAT FIJI MIGHT FEEL MORE COMFORTABLE
WITH THIS ALSO. THERE APPEARED TO BE NO SUBSTANTIVE
PROBLEMS ON EITHER SIDE, SUBJECT TO TECHNICAL ADJUSTMENTS THAT
WOULD NOT ALTER THE INTENDED APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT.

6. BREADTH OF LANES. MOORE AND MORRIS GAVE DETAILED
EXPLANATION OF NEED FOR BROAD LANES IN ORDER TO PREVENT
ARCHIPELAGO FROM BECOMING LUCRATIVE AREA FOR SUPRISE
ATTACK FROM UNKNOWN SUBMARINE LURKING OUTSIDE THE
LANES. WE EXPLAINED IN DETAIL HOW THIS LED US TO THE
CONCLUSION THAT 100 MILES WAS APPROPRIATE BREADTH FOR
LANES. INDONESIANS SAID THERE WAS A FUNDAMENTAL
DIFFERENCE IN CONCEPT, SINCE IN THEIR VIEW BREADTH OF
LANES SHOULD BE BASED SOLELY ON NAVIGATION SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS, AND NOT ON MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS.
MARSHAL SOEDARMONO SAID WE HAD TO BE PREPARED TO ASSUME
SOME RISK IN MAKING DECISION TO TRANSIT ARCHIPELAGO,
AND WOULD HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE GENERAL
SITUATION IN THE AREA IN MAKING THAT DECISION. WE
NOTED THAT WHILE THERE WOULD BE SOME RISK IN ANY
TRANSIT, THERE HAD TO BE A PRACTICAL USABLE RIGHT OF
TRANSIT, AND THAT THE BREADTH OF THE LANES COULD NOT
CREATE A RISK THAT WAS SO GREAT AS TO UNDERMINE THE
USABLE RIGHT. WHEN WE PROBED FOR EXPLANATION OF
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SPECIFIC INDONESIAN PROBLEMS, THEY MENTIONED A PROBLEM
AROUND BURU ISLAND, AND DESIRE TO AVOID FOREIGN
TRAFFIC IN THE AREA. WE NOTED THAT REQUIREMENT THAT
LANES COVER ALL NORMAL PASSAGE ROUTES THROUGH

ARCHIPELAGO, WHEN FUNCTIONALLY APPLIED, MEANT PASSAGE ROUTE BETWEEN POINT OF ENTRY FROM THE HIGH SEAS AND POINT OF EXIT TO THE HIGH SEAS, AND DID NOT REQUIRE DUPLICATION OF ROUTES BETWEEN THE SAME TWO POINTS. THIS WOULD PERMIT LANE TO BE KEPT AWAY FROM BURU. DJALAL ALSO MENTIONED FACT THAT 80 MILE LANE WOULD COVER AREAS OF POSSIBLE EXTENSIVE RESOURCE EXPLOITATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE JAVA SEA. WE NOTED THAT RESOURCE EXPLOITATION, INCLUDING OIL RIGS, WOULD BE PERMITTED IN THE LANES, SUBJECT ONLY TO REQUIREMENT OF NO UNJUSTIFIABLE INTERFERENCE WITH NAVIGATION. INDEED, THIS WAS ADVANTAGE OF BROADER LANE, SINCE IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE THE SAME LIBERAL VIEW IF LANES WERE NARROWER. WHEN WE PRESSED FURTHER ON BREADTH OF LANE, ADMIRAL MAHDI CIRCULATED CHART SHOWING BENT SCREEN CARRIER FORMATION OCCUPYING 15 MILES OF SEA AND INDICATING 20 MILE SEALANE. WE IN TURN EXPLAINED REASONING THAT COULD PERMIT REDUCTION OF SEALANE SIZE TO 80 MILES.

7. NATURE OF PASSAGE REGIME. IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, MARSHAL SOEDARMONO NOTED THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMMERCIAL AND NON-COMMERCIAL VESSELS. THE PURPOSE OF THE LANES WAS FOR NON-COMMERCIAL VESSELS, BUT THEY WOULD ALSO BE FOR EVERYONE. IN ADDITION COMMERCIAL VESSELS WOULD BE ABLE TO GO ALMOST ANYWHERE OUTSIDE LANES ALONG NORMAL ROUTES EXISTING UNTIL NOW. INDONESIA WAS STILL THINKING IN TERMS OF INNOCENT PASSAGE. IT DOES NOT MATTER IF IT IS CALLED INNOCENT PASSAGE OR SOMETHING ELSE: THE MAIN THING IS THAT THE PASSAGE IS FOR NONAGGRESSIVE PURPOSES. WE EXPLAINED OUR DIFFICULTIES WITH MAKING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF VESSELS AND OUR INABILITY TO ACCEPT INNOCENT PASSAGE IN THE LANES. HOWEVER, WE NOTED OUR WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE IN THE TEXT FOR PROHIBITION ON THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE UN CHARTER AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL

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INDEPENDENCE OF THE ARCHIPELAGIC STATE. WHILE INNOCENT PASSAGE WOULD APPLY FOR ALL VESSELS OUTSIDE THE LANES, WE COULD SEE PROVIDING FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF INNOCENT PASSAGE, OR A NOTICE REQUIREMENT WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION AS TO TYPE OR NATIONALITY, IN SPECIFIED AREAS OUTSIDE THE LANES WHERE NECESSARY FOR SECURITY PURPOSES. THUS INDONESIA COULD ACHIEVE THE SECURITY OBJECTIVES WITHOUT A DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMMERCIAL AND MILITARY VESSELS. IN HIS CLOSING REMARKS, MARSHAL SOEDARMONO AGAIN REFERRED TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MILITARY TRANSIT AND COMMERCIAL TRANSIT.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

----- 036742

R 120230Z DEC 74

FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5630

INFO USMISSION NEW YORK

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY NASSAU

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 JAKARTA 14919

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

EXDIS

USUN PLEASE PASS STEVENSON

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POLAD PLEASE PASS AMBASSADORS NEWSOM AND SULLIVAN

8. OVERFLIGHT: SOEDARMONO SAID THAT THE MAIN INDONESIAN CONCERN IS THE PROTECTION OF LOCAL AIR TRAFFIC WHICH CANNOT BE JEOPARDIZED BY TRANSITING AIRCRAFT. LOCAL AVIATION INCLUDES PROPELLER PLANES, JET PROPS, AND JETS. DJALAL ALSO NOTED THAT RESOURCE EXPLOITATION IS CONDUCTED BY HELICOPTER AND THAT FREQUENTLY AIRCRAFT ARE THE ONLY MEANS OF COMMUNICATION WITH REMOTE PARTS OF INDONESIA. SANTIOSO ELABORATED ON PROBLEMS OF AIR TRAFFIC SAFETY. US PRESENTED IDEA OF ALTITUDE LIMITATIONS IN WHICH TRANSIT WITHOUT NOTICE COULD BE EFFECTED THROUGH 5,000 FOOT RESERVED AIR SPACE BLOCKS BETWEEN 10,000-20,000 FEET, 20,000-30,000 FEET AND 40,000 FEET. (THE RESERVED AIR SPACE BLOCKS WILL

PROVIDE AN ALTERNATE TO ICAO FLIGHT CORRIDERS AND WILL
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PRESERVE EXISTING FREE RIGHT OF TRANSIT OVER AREAS
QTICH ARE PRESENTLY HIGHT SEAS.) ALTITUDES BETWEEN
BLOCKS OF AIR SPACE WOULD BE COMPLETELY SAFE FOR CROSS
TRAFFIC. AFTER STUDY, SOEDARMONO REPLIED THAT THE
AIR SPACE BLOCK SYSTEM STILL PRESENTS PROBLEMS FOR
LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL AIR NAVIGATION. THE QUESTION
OF TRANSITING AIRCRAFT RESPONDING, IF QUERIED, TO
GROUND CONTROL WAS ALSO RAISED BY DJALAL BUT NOT
PURSUED. THE TENOR OF THE COMMENTS EMPHASIZED PARTI-
CULAR PROBLEMS WITH THE LOWER ALTITUDE CORRIDER, AND
NOT WITH OVERFLIGHT PRINCIPLE. IN THIS CONNECTION
DJALAL PRIVATELY CONFIRMED THAT INDONESIA ACCEPTED
RIGHT OF OVERFLIGHT, SUBJECT TO ALTITUDE LIMITATIONS
TO ACCOMMODATE SAFETY CONCERNS.

9. STRAITS. MOORE, OXMAND MORRIS ELABORATED US
VIEWS ON ISSUE NOTING SCOPE OF RIGHT, INCLUDING SUBMERGED
TRANSIT AND OVERFLIGHT WITHOUT PRIOR NOTIFICATION
AND WITHOUT DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMMERCIAL AND

MILITARY TRANSIT; ACCOMMODATION OF STRAITS STATE
CONCERNS REGARDING SECURITY, SAFETY OF NAVIGATION,
AND POLLUTION; POSSIBILITY FOR SPECIAL INTERNATIONALLY
APPROVED SAFETY AND POLLUTION MEASURES TO DEAL WITH
SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN PARTICULAR STRAITS SUCH AS MALACCA;
AND LIABILITY. DJALAL SAID THE SPECIFIC POINT OF
DISAGREEMENT WAS ON NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL APPROVAL OF
SPECIAL SAFETY AND POLLUTION RULES. INDONESIA WOULD
LIKE ADVISE BUT THE DECISION SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE
STRAITS STATE. HE SPECIFICALLY CRITICIZED THE INTERNATIONAL
STANDARD THAT AN ADEQUATE SAFETY MARGIN WITH
RESPECT TO DEPTH WOULD BE 10 PERCENT OF THE DRAFT OF
THE SHIP. THERE MIGHT ALSO BE A NEED FOR PILOTAGE
AND FOR REPORTING, SINCE LARGE TANKERS COULD REQUIRE
UP TO 8 MILES TO STOP. BOTH DJALAL AND MRS. WIRJOSAPOETRO
NOTED THAT INDONESIA HAS NOT HAD A CHANCE TO CONSULT
WITH NEIGHBORING STRAITS STATES AND OTHERS SINCE CARACAS.
SHE ARGUED IN FAVOR OF INNOCENT PASSAGE REGIME, BUT
NOTED THAT WHAT US HAD DISCUSSED CAME DOWN TO INNOCENT
PASSAGE, AND LATER PRIVATELY CONFIRMED THAT THE
ISSUE WAS ONE OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE REGIME
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WHICH MIGHT NOT BE CALLED EITHER FREE TRANSIT OR INNOCENT PASSAGE (OUR IMPRESSION IS SHE WAS LAYING DOMESTIC CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION FOR AGREEMENT). MARSHAL SOEDARMONO NOTED THAT THE PROBLEM OF POLLUTION RELATED NOT ONLY TO OIL BUT TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR POWER, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF INCREASED COMMERCIAL USE OF NUCLEAR POWER. IMPRESSION WAS THAT THEY WERE SATISFIED WITH OUR RESPONSE BASED ON US STRAITS POSITION.

10. POLITICAL SCENARIO. MOORE EMPHASIZED THAT PACKAGE HAD TO INCLUDE PUBLIC GOI SUPPORT ON STRAITS AT GENEVA SESSION. WE OUTLINED SCENARIO PREDICATED ON AGREEMENT BETWEEN USG AND GOI ON ARCHIPELAGOS AND STRAITS WITH US CONSULTING WITH MANTIME STATES AND GOI WITH ARCHIPELAGO AND NEIGHBORING STRAITS STATES, AND PSBLIC MUTUAL EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT ON ARCHIPELAGOS AND STRAITS AT GENEVA. GOI AND OTHERS MIGHT INTRODUCE THE AGREED ARCHIPELAGO TEXT, WITH US INDICATING SUPPORT, AND CONCOMITANTLY GOI COULD INDICATE PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR AGREED STRAITS TEXT INTRODUCED BY US OR SOMEONE ELSE. WE EMPHASIZED THAT TACTICS WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT CAREFULLY SO AS TO AVOID IMPRESSION THAT S AND INDONESIA WERE ATTEMPTING TO IMPOSE SOLUTION ON THE REST OF THE WORLD, AND ACCORDINGLY DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO USE BLUNT INSTRUMENTS SUCH AS A JOINT COMMUNIQUE. CURIOUSLY, MRS. WIRJOSAPOETRO, WHOSE PRINCIPAL CONCERN SEEMS CONSISTENTLY TO BE INDONESIAN RELATIONS WITH GROUP OF 77, AGREED WITH AND ELABORATED ON THIS SCENARIO SHOULD THERE BE SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT. DJALAL MENTIONED THE NEED FOR CONTINUING TACTICAL COORDINATION AT TEHRAN AND ELSEWHERE BETWEEN USG AND GOI.

11. CONFIDENTIALITY OF TALKS. IT WAS AGREED THAT SUBSTANCE OF TALKS WOULD BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL. US WOULD INFORM MARITIME STATES PLUS AUSTRALIA OF GENERAL NATURE OF TALKS. TEAM WOULD, OF COURSE, TELL PHILIPPINES WE HAD BEEN IN JAKARTA BUT WOULD NOT CHARACTERIZE INDONESIAN POSITIONS. GOI SAID THEY WOULD TRANSMIT RELEVANT INFORMATION TO THE PHILIPPINES AS A MATTER OF CONFIDENTIAL

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COURTESY AND WE HAD IMPRESSION SOME INFORMATION MIGHT BE TRANSMITTED PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF US TEAM IN MANILA.

12. COMMENT: IN VIEW OF MUCH GREATER PROGRESS IN MOORE-SOEDARMONO DIRECT TALKS THAN IN LARGER FULL DELEGATION SESSIONS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO PLACE FULL DELEGATION MEETINGS IN CONTEXT OF FURTHER PROGRESS IN

THESE DIRECT TALKS AND CLEAR INDICATION OF SOEDARMONO'S
INTENTION TO HEAD A SMALL (2-3 MAN) INDONESIAN TEAM
TO WASHINGTON IN LATE JANUARY OR FEBRUARY TO "DOT THE
I'S OF THE FINAL UNDERSTANDING.
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Message Attributes

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Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
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30 JUN 2005

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TAGS: PLOS, ID, US, (MOORE, JOHN NORTON), (SOEDARMONO)
To: STATE
Type: TE
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